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Abstract
The sequential auction problem is commonplace in open, electronic marketplaces
such as eBay. This problem occurs when a buyer faces a complex strategic problem
in bidding across multiple auctions, each selling similar or essentially identical items
and when the buyer would have a simple, truth-revealing strategy if there was but
a single auction event. Our model allows for multiple, distinct goods and market
dynamics with buyers and sellers that arrive over time. Sellers each bring a single
unit of a good to the market while buyers can have values on bundles of goods.
We model each individual auction as a second-price (Vickrey) auction and propose
an options-based, proxied solution to provide price and winner-determination coor-
dination across auctions. While still allowing for temporally uncoordinated market
participation, this options-based approach solves the sequential auction problem
and provides a market in which truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy for
buyers. An empirical study suggests that this coordination can enable a signiﬁcant
eﬃciency and revenue improvement over the current eBay market design, and high-
lights the various eﬀects on performance of complex buyer valuations (buyers with
substitutes and complements valuations) and in varying the market liquidity.
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Electronic markets generate signiﬁcant new trading opportunities and expand
the opportunity for the dynamic pricing of goods, and lead to improved market
eﬃciency in many settings [9,10,54]. Electronic markets ﬁnd application not
only for person-to-person transactions (e.g., auctions), but also increasingly
for business-to-consumer auctions such as selling surplus inventory [35] and
business-to-business sourcing events [50].
But despite the new eﬃciencies oﬀered by electronic markets, for example by
enabling the application of optimization to decision making in many parts of
the supply chain, the role of automated trading agents – although long en-
visioned by artiﬁcial intelligence researchers [51,23,1] – remains more ﬁction
than reality. (One notable exception is the signiﬁcant role of automated trad-
ing for ﬁnancial securities [20].) One major impediment to the adoption of
automated trading agents is that users often have insuﬃcient trust of soft-
ware agents that would work on their behalf [14,33]. Users may even have
higher expectations for automated agents than human agents in regard to
what constitutes acceptable behavior [53]. For example, the proposal by the
London International Financial Futures Exchange (Liﬀe) to introduce auto-
mated trading was the cause of much debate. 4 A key area of concern was
that users could not be certain that the automated systems would behave
“optimally” in all situations.
One important, if unsurprising, aspect that seems important in the adop-
tion of automated agents is that these agents avoid, and be seen to avoid,
making mistakes [41]. In the context of electronic markets, an insight oﬀered
by mechanism design, the subdiscipline of microeconomics that seeks to de-
sign protocols to achieve system-wide objectives with self-interested agents,
is that one can sometimes design protocols that simplify the strategic con-
siderations of bidding agents. Classic solutions, such as those oﬀered by the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [30], provide this simplicity via the
property of strategyproofness (which brings truthful bidding into a dominant
strategy equilibrium), and in addition provide market eﬃciency. But we argue
that they are often not applicable in practice because they require too much
temporal coordination on the part of participants. Electronic markets such as
eBay 5 allow a would-be seller to decide when to sell goods in the marketplace,
and buyers can visit the marketplace at times of their own choosing. The VCG
mechanism on the other hand requires that buyers and sellers be grouped into
4 The Financial Times said at the time that “Electronic trading is the biggest single
issue to face the futures community today and the industry has long confronted a
philosophical split on its merits”, in an article “Liﬀe’s new automated trading system
has sparked a debate on automated trading,” November 30, 1989.
5 www.ebay.com
2a single, coordinated auction with all bids placed at the same time and all
goods sold at the same time. 6
In fact, the individual auctions on eBay are very similar to single-item second-
price (Vickrey) auctions rather than the more general VCG mechanism. The
most signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that eBay provides, via the use of a mandatory
proxy agent that bids on behalf of a buyer, a “staged Vickrey auction” such
that a buyer can eﬀectively increase her bid price at any time until an auction
closes. 7 Electronic markets such as eBay do not provide a VCG mechanism at
the level of a category of goods, for instance all LCD monitors in the market,
arguably because this would require too much temporal coordination on the
part of buyers and sellers. A second issue would be determining how to deﬁne
the scope for such an event to include a suitable domain of goods likely to
subsume most of those of interest to a set of potential buyers. A third issue
is that at some point the computation and communication cost for running
such a large, coordinated mechanism would also get prohibitive given that
winner-determination for combinatorial auctions is NP-hard [49].
But the absence of such a large-scale coordination mechanism in markets such
as eBay leads to strategic complexity for participants. Despite a (weak) strate-
gic equivalence between an individual auction on eBay and the Vickrey auc-
tion [36,55], there are many reasons for buyers not to truthfully bid their value
in any one auction. One reason follows from the auction being staged rather
than sealed-bid. Because some bidders may be “followers” – bidding up when
others do – it can be rational to delay until the last minute and “snipe” to
avoid driving up competitors’ bid prices [40,3]. The sequential auction prob-
lem provides another reason. This relates to issues that arise when composing
strategies across a sequence of auctions.
For an example, suppose that multiple copies of essentially identical items are
oﬀered for sale sequentially. For example, Alice may want an LCD monitor,
and could potentially bid in either a 1 o’clock or 3 o’clock auction. Alice
would prefer to participate in the auction that will have the lower winning
price, but she cannot determine beforehand which auction that will be. As a
result, she could end up winning in the “wrong” auction, that is the auction
6 Generalizations of the VCG mechanism to dynamic settings have been devel-
oped [43], but are not immediately applicable in this context for reasons discussed
in the related work.
7 While an eBay auction is open, a buyer provides her automated proxy agent with
a bid ceiling. While the ceiling the agent has received is greater than the winning
price and the agent is not winning, the agent will submit a bid some amount, ǫ,
above the current winning price (where ǫ > 0 is set by eBay anywhere from cents to
dollars depending on the value of the item). Therefore, when an auction ends, the
winning buyer will pay a price ǫ above the highest ceiling another buyer submitted,
and the outcome is nearly identical to the outcome of the Vickrey auction.
3with the higher price. A related example of the sequential auction problem
is familiar from the exposure problem studied in simultaneous ascending price
auctions [12], which also exists in our setting when a buyer desires a bundle
of goods but must participate in auctions on individual items. For example,
if Alice values a video game console by itself for $200, a video game by itself
for $30, and both a console and game for $250, she must determine how much
of the $20 of synergy value to include in her bid when bidding for the console
alone. If Alice incorporates some of the synergy value (e.g., by placing a bid
of $210), she may incur a loss if she can not subsequently win the video game
for less than $40. 8
The main technical question addressed in this paper is: can one design an
eﬃcient marketplace for temporally uncoordinated buyers and sellers, and dis-
tinct goods, in which buyers have a simple, dominant-strategy bidding strategy?
As a solution we propose a real-options based market infrastructure, coupled
with proxy bidding, that enables simple, yet optimal, bidding strategies while
retaining the dynamic arrivals and departures that are a deﬁning feature of
electronic markets such as eBay. Our main assumptions are that:
• Buyers may have general valuations on bundles of distinct goods, but are
interested in at most one unit of each of these goods.
• Each buyer has an arrival time and a departure time in the market, and is
indiﬀerent between buying items at any time before her departure and with
zero value after her departure.
• Each seller oﬀers a single unit of a good, has no intrinsic value for the good,
and is willing to wait until the departure time of a winning buyer to receive
her payment.
• Sellers are non-strategic and truthfully report arrival and departure to the
market, which deﬁnes the interval of time during which they are willing to
sell the good.
• Goods can be placed into equivalence classes so that all buyers are indiﬀerent
between goods in the same class.
Note that we will not need to assume that buyers can only participate un-
der one identity or prevent buyers from re-entering the market; this provides
robustness to the false-name bidding considered by Yokoo [59].
8 A third reason for strategic complexity in markets such as eBay can be that the
quality of items may be uncertain and buyers may adjust their belief about the
value of the item based on others’ bids; this is the so-called interdependent values
model of auction theory. We do not consider interdependent value domains in this
paper. This makes our results applicable instead to markets in which buyers know
their value for goods and can determine this without seeing the bids from others. An
example of such a domain is provided by our empirical study on the eBay market
for a Dell LCD monitor.
4The ﬁnal assumption is probably the strongest. But we note that many items
listed in an eBay auction are essentially identical to those in other auctions,
and especially in categories such as Consumer Electronics, where the sum of
all successfully closed listings during 2005 was U.S. $3.5B (of U.S. $44B in
total for all of eBay) [22]. This category is the focus of our empirical analysis,
in which we consider auctions for 19” Dell LCD monitors (Model E193FP)
conducted on eBay during the summer of 2005. Moreover, we do not require
that an individual buyer necessarily has a diﬀerent value for goods in diﬀerent
classes, and diﬀerent buyers need not hold the same value for goods within
a particular class. The only property that is important is that every buyer’s
individual value is the same for any good within a class. 9
In the options-based solution, a seller auctions an option for her good rather
than auctioning the good directly. The option will ultimately either lead to
a sale or require the seller to return to the market and oﬀer another option
on the same good. By participation in the framework, sellers agree to allow
proxy agents to price-match their goods against others of equal type, with the
payment a seller ﬁnally receives deﬁned in terms of the minimal price that
the winning bidder could have bid and still traded with some seller in some
auction during her arrival-departure interval. As noted above, we assume that
sellers have no intrinsic value for the good and moreover are non-strategic in
that they will truthfully report their temporal constraints in the marketplace.
All buyers in our framework must interact through proxy agents and do so
by reporting a value on all possible bundles of goods of interest along with a
departure time. While such an enumeration may seem daunting at ﬁrst glance,
there are several reasons not to view this as a major concern in consumer
markets. First, a very common purchasing scenario is for a buyer to want
a single item or to be indiﬀerent among only a few diﬀerent items. Second,
Cantillon and Pesendorfer [13] and Sandholm [50] provide empirical support
that buyers can manage to construct bids in large combinatorial settings.
Third, a number of expressive, concise bidding languages have been developed
for combinatorial auctions [15,39,7].
A proxy agent uses the reported information about value and departure time
to determine how to bid for options and also to determine which options held
at the buyer’s reported departure time to exercise. The options that maximize
the buyer’s surplus given the reported valuation are exercised and all other
options are returned to the seller. The options-based protocol is useful because
it makes truthful and immediate revelation to a proxy a dominant strategy for
9 In the absence of a third party logistics partner, such as Amazon, that oﬀers
fulﬁllment and commits to the quality of a good (e.g. new, and “in box”) it is likely
that sellers could improve revenue in the short-term by overstating the quality of
their item and misleading buyers in the marketplace. However, and just as on on
eBay, a well-functioning reputation system should mitigate this concern [47].
5buyers, whatever the future auction dynamics. Thus it can be seen as a method
to generalize eBay’s existing proxy scheme to handle the sequential auction
problem in suitable categories of goods, while extending to embrace dynamic,
combinatorial auctions.
An empirical analysis is performed using data on eBay auctions for 19” Dell
LCD monitors (Model E193FP) sold from 27 May, 2005 through 1 October,
2005. A conservative estimate is that an improvement in eﬃciency and revenue
of around 4% and 9% respectively would be enabled through an options-based
scheme. This estimate is generated on the basis of non-parametric estimation
of the true value of buyers for items, generalizing a method due to Haile
and Tamer [24] to sequential auctions. The eBay analysis also informs an
extensive set of simulation experiments, in which we explore the eﬀect of
substitutes (“I want A or B”) and complements (“I only want A if I also get B”)
valuations on the eﬃciency of the options-based scheme and also consider the
impact of market liquidity. Buyer populations with substitutes valuations can
hamper the eﬃciency of the marketplace because of hold-up problems in which
a buyer’s proxy holds a number of options that ultimately go unexercised but
were unavailable to other buyers. However we ﬁnd that this eﬀect is mitigated
when individual buyers have negatively correlated values across items. We
also ﬁnd that the buyer-to-seller ratio (a measure of liquidity) plays a critical
role in market eﬃciency in the context of substitutes valuations. Eﬃciency
ﬁrst decreases and then increases as the buyer-to-seller ratio increases and
the market becomes more competitive. For a low buyer-to-seller ratio the
market remains eﬃcient with substitutes valuations because there is plenty of
supply. Market eﬃciency is also high for relatively large buyer-to-seller ratios
(above 4:1 in our simulations) and substitutes valuations because increased
competition segments the market; buyers tend to be competitive on only a
small number of goods. In the context of complements valuations we ﬁnd that
market eﬃciency is fairly insensitive to positive or negative correlation in value
across items and remains reasonably high.
By providing a system in which buyers possess a simple, dominant strategy, the
proxy-based solution arguably reduces the participation costs of buyers. While
the impact of this improvement is hard to estimate, this can be expected to
both improve buyer loyalty to sellers and also make the market more appealing
for new entrants. These two eﬀects ought to preserve and enhance the health
of the market and maintain seller revenue in the long term.
There are a variety of extensions beyond the immediate purview of this work
which could further enhance the performance of the options-based scheme.
We mention some of these opportunities, and challenges, in discussion and in
oﬀering conclusions. In outline, we will ﬁrst discuss related work, and then
use Section 2 to introduce the model and deﬁne and characterize the sequen-
tial auction problem. Section 3 describes the options-based scheme, giving
6examples and a complexity analysis. Section 4 provides a strategic analysis
and a worst-case eﬃciency analysis. Section 5 presents an experimental study,
ﬁrst on eBay data (the LCD market) and then extending – in simulation –
to consider substitutes and complements preferences and the eﬀect of market
liquidity. Section 6 discusses the challenges of allowing proxy agents to bid
less aggressively, thus mitigating hold-up. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Work
A number of authors have analyzed sequential auctions selling the same item
with buyers interested in buying just a single item. This “multiple copies
problem” is often studied in the context of explaining sniping behavior; see also
Ockenfels and Roth [40], who give a collusion-based explanation for sniping.
From the perspective of developing models for the multiple copies problem,
Stryszowska [56] models the problem as one of a dynamic multi-unit auction,
allowing for explanations of sniping as well as for bidding multiple times within
an auction. Hendricks et al. [27] demonstrate that sniping is a symmetric
equilibrium in the absence of a “BuyItNow” opportunity (wherein a buyer
can choose to buy an item at any point for some ﬁxed price). Wang [57]
demonstrates, using a two-period model, how sniping in the ﬁrst period is a
unique equilibrium and Zeithammer [60] provides an equilibrium model for
strategic sellers and forward-looking buyers. Notably, none of this prior work
considers buyers that are able to participate in more than two auctions, while
we consider settings in which buyers may participate in an arbitrary number
of auctions. Peters and Severinov [45] also allow this more general capability
and characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where sellers set a reserve
price equal to their true costs. These authors consider neither buyers entering
at random times nor auctions closing at diﬀerent times, both of which are
addressed in our work. While these papers provide a Bayesian-Nash analysis
of models that approximate current eBay-like markets, we study the dominant
strategy equilibrium in an options-based variation on current markets.
Problems of the same kind as the sequential auction problem were previously
observed by Wellman and Wurman [58] in the context of boundaries between
multiple mechanisms, and later discussed by Parkes [42] and Ng et al. [37,38]
in the context of “strategyproof computing.” The problem has often been
identiﬁed in the context of simultaneous ascending price auctions, where it
is termed the exposure problem [12]. Previous work to address the exposure
problem has considered two diﬀerent directions. First, one can change the
mechanism and deﬁne an expressive bidding language and a strategyproof
mechanism, as seen in work on combinatorial auctions [49]. Second, one can
attempt to provide automated bidding agents with sophisticated strategies, as
seen for example in the work of Boutilier et al. [6], Byde et al. [11], Anthony
7and Jennings [1], Reeves et al. [46], and Gerding et al. [21]. Unfortunately,
it seems hard to design artiﬁcial agents with equilibrium bidding strategies,
even for a simultaneous ascending price auction (i.e. without dynamic arrivals
of new sellers) and all these papers make signiﬁcant assumptions.
Iwasaki et al. [29] have previously considered the use of options in the context
of a single, monolithic, auction design to help buyers with marginal-increasing
values avoid exposure in a multi-unit, homogeneous item auction. Sandholm
and Lesser [52] have considered options in the form of leveled commitment
contracts for facilitating multi-way recontracting in a completely decentralized
market place. Rothkopf and Engelbrecht-Wiggans [48] discuss the advantages
associated with the use of options for selling coal mine leases. To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst work to study the role of options as a method
to enable dominant strategies in the context of dynamic auctions. Gopal et
al. [22] have considered the use of options for reducing exposure to risk in the
context of the sequential auction problem. Our work diﬀers in a number of
ways, including how the options are priced, which buyers obtain options, and
in how much risk remains with buyers once options are used. Buyers still face
risk and have no dominant strategy in the method of Gopal et al. [22].
The technical contribution of this paper is related to online mechanism de-
sign [32,44,26,43]. In online mechanism design (online MD), one seeks an in-
centive mechanism for a dynamic environment in which agents arrive and
depart and in which there is uncertainty about the future. In the analysis
of our protocol, we slightly generalize the price-based characterization of Ha-
jiaghayi et al. [25] to establish a dominant strategy equilibrium for buyers,
creating a truthful online combinatorial auction from an uncoordinated se-
quence of single item auctions. The options-based scheme generalizes the ear-
lier protocol in Hajiaghayi et al. [25] to combinatorial settings but is equiva-
lent in an environment in which everyone is buying and selling a single unit
of the same kind of good, albeit with a decentralized architecture. Dynamic
VCG mechanisms [4,44,16] are unsuitable because they handle only one-sided
markets, require optimal allocation policies (which may be intractable in do-
mains of interest), and provide a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium rather than full
strategyproofness. A dynamic extension of the expected externality mecha-
nism [2,18] is suitable for dynamic two-sided markets, but would again require
an optimal policy and provide only a weak guarantee about the relationship
between a buyer’s payment and her bid price. Bredin et al. [8] provide simple
two-sided dynamic auction protocols that support dominant-strategy equilib-
rium, but only for an environment in which all buyers and sellers are interested
in trading a single unit of a commodity good.
It is interesting to note that some of the strategic diﬃculties that buyers face
in uncoordinated electronic auctions such as eBay are also faced by consumers
acquiring items in the retail sector and it is interesting that retail stores have
8developed policies that can be interpreted as assisting customers in this regard.
Return policies alleviate the exposure problem by allowing customers to return
goods at the purchase price while price matching alleviates the multiple copies
problem by allowing buyers to receive from sellers after purchase the diﬀerence
between the price paid for a good and a lower price found elsewhere [17,34]. A
concern that is discussed in the academic literature in regard to these practices
in the retail sector is that they can be anti-competitive, with sellers using
them as a commitment device for avoiding price competition [28]. We do not
foresee this issue in the context of proxied, sequential auctions as proposed in
this paper because the prices are not set by sellers but rather determined by
competition on the buy side.
2 Preliminaries: The Sequential Auction Problem
In this section we introduce the formal model and deﬁne and characterize the
sequential auction problem which motivates our work.
2.1 The Model
In our domain, there are K diﬀerent kinds of goods (often referred to as items),
denoted with set G and G1,...,GK for the individual kinds of goods, a set B
of buyers (perhaps unbounded), a set S of sellers (perhaps unbounded), and
T = {0,1,...} discrete time periods. Each buyer i ∈ B has a utility function
parameterized with type θi = (ai,di,vi) ∈ Θ, where Θ is the set of all possible
types, deﬁning her arrival time ai ∈ T, departure time di ≥ ai ∈ T, and
valuation vi(L) ≥ 0 for every possible bundle of goods L ⊆ G. We assume that
no buyer demands more than a single unit of each good and write Lk ∈ {0,1}
to denote whether or not bundle L contains a unit of good Gk. We assume
free disposal and normalization, with vi(L) ≥ vi(S) for L ⊇ S and vi(∅) = 0.
The semantics of arrival and departure are such that buyer i has value vi(L) ≥
0 for a bundle of goods L ⊆ G that is allocated (potentially in multiple pieces)
across periods [ai,...,di] and is indiﬀerent to goods allocated outside of this
time interval; i.e., buyers have no value for goods allocated after departure di.
Buyers have quasi-linear utilities, so that the utility of buyer i for receiving
bundle L and paying p ∈ R≥0, in some period no later than di, is ui(L,p) =
vi(L) − p. For the sake of analysis it is convenient to assume the existence of
a maximal patience, such that di − ai ≤ ∆max, for some constant ∆max.
The arrival time models the period in which a buyer ﬁrst realizes her demand
and enters the market. The departure time models the period in which a buyer
9loses interest in acquiring the good(s) from this marketplace. For example, a
buyer may lose interest in items whose value is realized at a speciﬁc past
moment in time (e.g., Saturday night movie tickets), or because she simply
wishes to take advantage of an outside opportunity to acquire the item (e.g.,
a buyer deciding to acquire an item at a posted price on a certain date).
Modeling a buyer’s value as constant during the arrival-departure interval is
especially reasonable when the interval is small in relation to the time over
which the good(s) will be used; e.g., an LCD monitor that a buyer plans on
using for 3 years provides a buyer with roughly equivalent value if held for
1000 days or 998 days.
Each seller j ∈ S brings a single unit of one kind of good, denoted kj ∈ G to
the market and is assumed to have no intrinsic value for the good. Seller j has
an arrival time, aj ∈ T, which models the period in which she is ﬁrst interested
in listing the item, and a departure time, dj ≥ aj ∈ T, which models the latest
period in which she is willing to consider having an auction for the item close.
By listing a good for sale until dj, a seller is indicating her willingness to receive
payment by the end of the reported departure of the winning buyer. 10 We
will not be concerned with strategic behavior by sellers and focus our analysis
on removing the sequential auction problem for buyers whatever the strategy
of sellers.
The options-based framework provides a direct-revelation (online) mechanism
in which each buyer i interacts with the market only once by declaring a
bid, bi ∈ Θ, which is a (perhaps untruthful) claim about her type. Denoting
the bids from all buyers as b = (b1,...,bn), a direct-revelation mechanism
determines an allocation xi(b) ⊆ G and payment, pi(b) ≥ 0, to each buyer.
The outcome also depends on the sell-side, i.e. the goods that are brought
to market, but we leave this dependence silent in the notation. Since this is
an online setting, with the bids are reported over time, the allocation and
payment functions must be online computable; i.e. if a buyer is to be allocated
an item for sale in period t then this must be known based on information
available up to and including period t.
In this dynamic environment we follow earlier models [32,26,25], and assume
limited misreports, so that a buyer is assumed to be unable to bid before her
true arrival period. Formally, we adopt Y (θi)   Θ to denote the set of available
misreports, such that θ′
i = (a′
i,d′
i,v′
i) ∈ Y (θi) ⇒ a′
i ≥ ai. Given these limited
misreports, a dominant strategy equilibrium requires that every buyer, i ∈ B,
10 This delay in receiving payment is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than what sellers
on eBay currently endure in practice. An auction on eBay closes at a speciﬁc time,
but a seller must wait until a buyer relinquishes payment before being able to
realize the revenue, an amount of time that could easily be days (if payment is via a
money order sent through courier) to much longer (if a buyer is slow but not overtly
delinquent in remitting her payment).
10has a bidding strategy b∗
i(θi) ∈ Y (θi)   Θ that maximizes her utility whatever
the bids of other buyers and for all possible future dynamics. Formally, this
requires that:
vi(xi(b
∗
i(θi),b−i)) − pi(b
∗
i(θi),b−i)≥vi(xi(b
′
i,b−i)) − pi(b
′
i,b−i), (2.1)
∀b
′
i ∈ Y (θi),∀b−i ∈ Θ−i,∀θi ∈ Θ,
for every buyer i ∈ B, where b−i = (b1,...,bi−1,bi+1,...,bn), and Θ−i =
Π =iΘ, i.e. the joint type space of the other buyers. A mechanism is said to be
strategyproof when reporting the true type is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Note that this holds for all dynamics and thus for all sell-side strategies.
Because we are concerned with markets in which there may be multiple in-
dividual auctions available to a buyer, it is useful to adopt the terminology
locally strategyproof for an auction in which truthful bidding is a dominant
strategy if a buyer was restricted to bidding in that one auction [42]. This
would be true, for example, if the auction is for a unique item that is only
available for auction once in a buyer’s lifetime (e.g., a piece of artwork for
which there is no substitute), or if a buyer is very impatient. In Section 5 we
present empirical evidence to suggest that this is generally not true in markets
such as eBay.
2.2 The Sequential Auction Problem
The sequential auction problem describes the strategic problem that can face
a buyer even though she faces a sequence of locally strategyproof auctions.
Consider the following two motivating examples:
Example 1 Alice values acquiring one ton of sand before Wednesday for
$1,000. Bob will hold a Vickrey auction for one ton of sand on Monday,
and another such auction on Tuesday. Alice has no dominant bidding strategy
because she cannot predict whether the price of the Tuesday auction will be
greater or less than the price of the Monday auction, and she needs to know
this price when deciding on an optimal bidding strategy on Monday.
Example 2 Alice values one ton of sand with one ton of stone at $2,000.
Bob holds a Vickrey auction for one ton of sand on Monday. Charlie holds
a Vickrey auction for one ton of stone on Tuesday. Alice has no dominant
bidding strategy because she needs to know the price for stone on Tuesday in
order to know how much to bid for sand on Monday. If Alice bids too high on
Monday, she may be left with one ton of sand but no ability to buy the one ton
of stone required to complete her construction project. If Alice bids too low on
Monday, she might forfeit the opportunity to buy both the sand and stone, for
11example if the price of stone on Tuesday is low.
Deﬁnition 1 (sequential auction problem) The sequential auction prob-
lem exists when a buyer has no dominant bidding strategy in a sequence of
auctions, despite each auction being locally strategyproof.
In characterizing the sequential auction problem, we consider a sequence of
auctions, A, that occur in periods t ∈ [ai,...,di]. There may be uncertainty
about this sequence of auctions from the perspective of the buyer. Let P,
with   p ∈ P, denote the set of possible prices that the buyer may face, where
a particular realization of prices corresponds to a particular realization of
supply (i.e., auctions A) and demand. A bundle L ⊆ G is strictly valued to
buyer i with valuation vi, if her value vi(L) > maxQ(L vi(Q). The empty
bundle is strictly-valued. Consider   p ∈ P and denote by IBi(  p) ∈ {0,1}m,
where m = |  p|, an optimal buying schedule given prices   p, i.e. maximizing
vi(S) − IBi(  p)     p, where S is the bundle purchased and S is restricted to a
strictly-valued bundle. Let   p<k, for k ≥ 1, denote the ﬁrst k elements of   p.
Fix a particular optimal buying schedule IBi. An interesting good is one that
is purchased for some prices   p ∈ P. An auction is interesting if it sells a good
that should be purchased in that auction for some prices   p ∈ P.
We say that (a) all interesting goods are uniquely supplied and (b) all uniquely
supplied goods have a certain marginal value if and only if there exists some
optimal buying schedule, IBi, for which:
(a) whenever good Gk is purchased in the auction immediately following initial
prices,   p<k, there are no prices   p,  q ∈ P with   p<k =   q<k such that the buyer
should buy Gk in a later auction (“good Gk is uniquely supplied”).
(b) for every (uniquely supplied) good Gk, then for all   p,  q ∈ P s.t.   p<k =   q<k,
and   pk ≥   qk, where k is the index of the auction for good Gk and   pk and   qk
denote the price in that auction, then Gk ∈ IBi(  p) ⇒ Gk ∈ IBi(  q) (“good Gk
has a certain marginal value”).
In particular, if there is no such buying schedule then there must be either an
interesting good that is not uniquely supplied (¬(a)) or an interesting good
that is uniquely supplied but has an uncertain marginal value (¬(b)). Note
that if a good Gk is only ever available in just one auction, and this auction is
always the last auction faced by a buyer, then this good must have a certain
marginal value because there are no future auctions about which there can be
uncertainty. As a special case, when a buyer faces only a single auction then
the market must satisfy both property (a) and (b). It is also easy to see that
if a buyer’s valuation function is induced from a linear-additive value on each
good that she acquires then (b) will trivially hold, with Gk ∈ IBi(  p) if and
only if   pk ≤ vk, the buyer’s value for good Gk.
12Proposition 1 Given a sequence of locally strategyproof single-item auctions,
the sequential auction problem exists if and only if at least one of the following
three conditions is true:
(¬(a)) there is an interesting good that is not uniquely supplied, or
(¬(b)) there is a uniquely supplied good with an uncertain marginal value, or
(c) there is more than one interesting auction and competitors’ bids can be
conditioned on the buyer’s past bids.
Proof. (⇒) Assume the sequential auction problem (SAP) and (a) ∧ (b) ∧
¬(c) for a contradiction. First, by ¬(c) the bids of other buyers are ﬁxed and
independent of the bids of buyer i and therefore the prices in each auction in A
are independent of the strategy of the buyer (since the auctions are also locally
strategyproof). Given this, by (a), there is an optimal buying schedule IBi for
which each good, when purchased in a particular auction, should never be
purchased in any other auction. Focus on the auctions in which a good may
be purchased and assume, without loss of generality, that these interesting
goods are sequenced from G1 to some good Gm. We establish a dominant
bidding strategy by induction on the number of the auction. The induction
hypothesis is that the agent holds the optimal bundle of goods at the start of
every auction, i.e. the bundle that it should have purchased given knowledge
of eventual prices   p. Base case: trivial because no goods have been oﬀered
and the optimal bundle is empty. Inductive case: by (b) there is some value vk
(perhaps ∞ or 0) s.t. the good should be purchased if and only if   pk ≤ vk and
whatever the prices in future auctions. Whether or not the good is acquired,
the buyer holds the optimal bundle for   p since it held the optimal bundle
at the start of this auction and it has made an optimal decision. This is a
contradiction with the SAP because we have constructed a buying schedule
that can be implemented online. 11
(⇐) Show that ¬(a) ∨¬(b) ∨(c) implies the SAP. ¬(a) implies the SAP (and
even if (b) ∧ ¬(c)) because there exist prices   p and an interesting good Gk
that is supplied in multiple, uncertainly ordered auctions, such that the buyer
should buy good Gk but there are other prices   q that diﬀer, in the future only,
for which the buyer should buy the good in a future auction. ¬(b) implies
the SAP (and even if (a) ∧ ¬(c)) because there is at least one good, and
one auction for that good, and two sets of prices that agree up until that
auction but may disagree afterward, for which even if the buyer has acquired
the optimal bundle of goods until this auction, as required by the eventual
realization of future prices, the good in the current auction has an uncertain
marginal value and therefore there is no single value the buyer can bid and
ensure the right decision for all realizations of price. (c) implies the SAP (and
even if (a)∧(b)) because a buyer’s bid may inﬂuence the bids of other buyers,
11 The buying schedule is temporally consistent in the sense that IBi(  p≤k) =k
IBi(  p≤l) for all l > k, all   p ∈ P, where =k requires that the ﬁrst k elements
are the same.
13so that a buyer can do better than bidding her true marginal value for a good
because this can trigger a high bid from a competitor in some future auction
for some strategy of that competitor.
To understand this theorem, ﬁrst consider a buyer who values one ton of sand
for $1,000 one ton of stone for $2,000 and both for $2,000 (i.e. substitutes
valuations). Suppose the buyer faces one auction for sand followed by one for
stone and that the possible prices allow for both goods to be utility maxi-
mizing. She faces the sequential auction problem because of condition ¬(b):
the sand has an uncertain marginal value because there are future prices for
which it is optimal to purchase sand and some for which it is optimal to pur-
chase stone. As a second example, consider a buyer who values one ton of
sand for $1,000 and one ton of sand and one ton of stone together for $1,500.
Suppose that the buyer faces an auction for sand and another for stone and
that both bundles {sand} and {sand,stone} may be utility optimizing given
possible prices. The good that ﬁrst goes to auction has uncertain marginal
value; this value is either $1,000 or $1,500 if the good is sand and $0 or $500
if the good is stone.
As another example, consider a buyer who values one ton of sand for $1,000
and faces two auctions for sand, either of which may have the lowest price.
She faces the sequential auction problem by condition ¬(a); here it occurs
because even though the marginal value is $1,000 and constant either auction
may have the best price. For a ﬁnal example, consider a buyer who values sand
for $1,000, stone for $500 and sand and stone together for $1,500 (i.e. a linear
valuation) and suppose just two auctions, one for sand and then one for stone.
Suppose one other buyer competes in both auctions. Both conditions (a) and
(b) hold. But if condition (c) holds then the competitor may bid $1,000,000
for stone if the buyer bids more than $300 for sand, and $10 otherwise. The
buyer is better to bid below $300 for sand, even if this involves losing that
auction, because she will then receive the stone for a payoﬀ of $1,490.
3 An Options-Based Scheme
In what follows we focus exclusively on domains in which the underlying auc-
tions are sealed-bid, Vickrey auctions for individual items. Vickrey auctions
are selected not only because of convenience, but also because they nicely
model eBay auctions. A Vickrey auction is a second price, sealed-bid auction.
The solution that we propose, in resolving the sequential auction problem in
this context, consists of two primary components: the use of real options to
allow buyers to secure the lowest possible prices and the use of mandatory
proxy agents to prevent the abuse of these options through costless hoarding.
14A real option is a right to acquire a real good at a certain price, called the
exercise price; see Dixit and Pindyck [19]. For instance, Alice may obtain from
Bob the right to buy sand from him at an exercise price of $1,000. An option
gives the right to purchase a good at an exercise price but does not imply an
obligation. We will see that this ﬂexibility makes options useful in addressing
the sequential auction problem. Proxy agents acting on behalf of buyers can
put together a collection of options, and then decide which options (perhaps
none) to exercise.
While the buyer of an option has the right but not the obligation to purchase
the good, the seller must honor the contract if the option is exercised. For
this reason, options are typically sold at a premium called the option price.
Several factors are often considered when a seller tries to determine how to
price an option with a particular exercise price, including the relationship
between the exercise price and the perceived value of the good available in
the option, the volatility of value the good may experience over time, and
the length of time over which a buyer can decide to exercise the option. Real
options are often diﬃcult to price as the metrics for determining a price are
diﬃcult to quantify. However, among traded options (i.e., options for traded
securities such as stock), much progress has been made in determining the
prices of options, with one of the most celebrated being the formula of Black
and Scholes [5].
The problem with options with a non-zero option price in our setting is that
they cannot support a simple, dominant bidding strategy because a buyer
would need to compute the expected value of an option to justify the cost.
But this expected value requires a probabilistic model of the future, which in
turn requires the buyer to model the bidding strategies and values of other
buyers. This is the very pattern of reasoning that we are trying to avoid in
designing the options-based marketplace! For this reason, we adopt costless
options, which always have an option price of zero. The exercise price is set
competitively in the marketplace.
The traditional issue with costless options is that buyers are always weakly
better oﬀ with a costless option than without one, whatever the exercise price.
A buyer need exercise only those option(s) that result in a gain of surplus
and bears no cost by not exercising an option. But having buyers that pursue
options that they have no intention of exercising would cause market eﬃciency
to unravel.
To prevent this kind of hoarding of options, we adopt mandatory proxy agents.
These proxy agents provide buyers with an obligation to exercise those options
that maximize their reported utility – as deﬁned by reported valuation ˆ vi
– given the exercise price. The proxy agents also act to restrict buyers to
acquiring only options that they might credibly choose to exercise. Only proxy
15agents place bids in the underlying auctions.
In Section 3.1 we give details about the proxied, options-based solution. Sec-
tion 3.2 provides a number of detailed examples and Section 3.3 provides a
complexity analysis. We delay until future sections a formal proof of strate-
gyproofness and any analysis of the eﬃciency and revenue properties.
3.1 The Bidding Proxy and Price-Matching Rules
In our framework we ﬁrst modify each individual Vickrey auction to sell a real
option for the underlying good to the highest bidder with an initial exercise
price equal to the second-highest bid price received. 12 Each option is costless,
and is set to expire at the end of the winning proxy’s patience. Proxy agents
bid in these auctions. In opting into the options-based protocol, a seller gives
the winning proxy agent the right to reduce the exercise price on the option
given evidence that a lower price would have been available had the proxy
waited and bid instead in some future auction. This is what we mean by
“price matching.”
Buyers must compete in the market by submitting a bid to their proxy agent.
For buyer i ∈ B, this bid occurs in some reported arrival time, ˆ ai ≥ ai, 13 and
is a claim about her valuation ˆ vi (perhaps untruthful) for diﬀerent bundles of
goods and also about her departure time ˆ di ≥ ˆ ai. All transactions are interme-
diated by proxy agents. In what follows, we describe the three steps that are
followed by a proxy agent: (a) acquiring options, (b) setting the exercise price
on options via seller-sanctioned price matching, and (c) exercising options.
This completely deﬁnes the options-based mechanism.
Step One: Acquiring Options. When an option pertaining to a good in
which a buyer is interested is available in an auction and the proxy does not
hold an option, then the proxy submits a bid equal to the buyer’s (reported)
maximum marginal value for the item. A proxy does not bid for an item on
which it already holds an option. The maximum marginal value for an item
Gk, given reported valuation ˆ vi, is deﬁned as:
bidi(k) = max
L⊆G
[ˆ vi(L ∪ {Gk}) − ˆ vi(L)] (3.1)
12 The system can also set a reserve price for each kind of good, provided that the
same reserve is adopted for all auctions selling the same good. Without such an
invariant reserve price, price matching would not be possible as a seller might be
required to match a price below their personal reserve price.
13 Recall that we assume that a buyer cannot submit a bid to her proxy until some
period after her true arrival, which is why we have ˆ ai ≥ ai.
16By bidding this value, a proxy will compete for any option that could
possibly be of beneﬁt to the buyer and choose not to bid only on those
options that could never be of value to the buyer. Note that this is a static
determination, made entirely in terms of the valuation of a buyer and
without considering the prices for which the proxy already holds options. In
bidding up to the maximal possible value of some item, the proxy is
considering the case that all goods in bundle L that go together with this
good will be available and for a price of $0. 14
Step Two: Pricing Options. Rather than acquire more than one option
on the same kind of good, proxy agents are authorized by sellers to adjust
the exercise price of an option that they win downwards. Such an
adjustment is made whenever a proxy discovers that it could have achieved a
better exercise price for an option on the same kind of good by waiting to
bid in a later auction. A proxy is able to identify such a missed opportunity
by storing locally, for each good on which it holds an option, the identity of
the active bidder (if any) that would have already won an option had the
proxy itself not won an option. For this, when a proxy ﬁrst wins an option it
stores in its local memory the identity (which may be a pseudonym) of the
proxy agent that it “bumped” from winning, if such a proxy exists.
To see how price matching works, ﬁx some good Gk on which the proxy
holds an option. The proxy now monitors future auctions for the same kind
of good and determines what the buyer population would be had the proxy
delayed its own bid until this auction. To make this determination, the proxy
requests from the auction the identities of the buyer proxies and their
bids. 15 The proxy with the highest bid in this auction amongst those whose
identity is not stored in the proxy’s local memory is exactly the buyer
against whom the proxy would be competing had it delayed its entry until
this auction. If the bid price of this other proxy is lower than the proxy’s
current exercise price then it price matches down to this high bid amount,
since this is exactly the price that the proxy could have achieved by delaying
its bid until this auction.
After price matching, one of two adjustments are made by the proxy for
14 If the proxy has knowledge that some items will not be for sale, or can lower-
bound the possible price on other items (e.g. because of a market-wide reservation
price adopted by sellers – see Footnote 12), then the marginal value can be modiﬁed
downwards to preclude such bundles or adjust downwards by lower bounds on the
price of items. Care must be taken, though. We return to this issue in Section 6.
15 In a marketplace such as eBay, this information could be provided (again in
pseudonymous form) by the market infrastructure. Moreover, the only information
that is minimally required is the highest bid price across all buyer proxies except
one stated by the proxy, and the identity of highest proxy if it was not the winner
of the auction.
17book-keeping purposes. First, if the proxy whose price was matched against
was the winner of the auction then the proxy’s local memory as it relates to
this good can be cleared. This is because the earlier bumped proxy must no
longer be bidding (else it would have won this auction), and thus the proxy’s
earlier win no longer aﬀects the set of active bidders for this good going
forward. On the other hand, if the winning proxy was that which was earlier
bumped, then the proxy that had the second highest bid in this auction –
namely the proxy whose bid triggered price matching – would have won
without the presence of the proxy in the market (because the earlier bumped
proxy would have not competed in the current auction).
Step Three: Exercising Options. At the reported departure time, ˆ di, the
proxy for buyer i chooses which options (if any) to exercise. The option(s)
that are exercised, L∗
i, are those that maximize the reported utility of the
buyer given the ﬁnal exercise price on each good:
L
∗
i ∈ argmax
L⊆O
[ˆ vi(γ(L)) − p(L)], (3.2)
where O is the set of all options held by the proxy, γ(L) ⊆ G are the goods
that correspond to some subset L ⊆ O of these options, and
p(L) =
P
k∈L p(k) is the total exercise price for this set of options where p(k)
is the exercise price on the option corresponding to good Gk. All other
options are returned. No options are exercised when there is no bundle of
options with (weakly) positive utility.
Remark: Re-posting seller options. An auction for the good brought to
market by a seller will ﬁrst occur at the arrival period of the seller. If at
some point later the buyer that wins this auction returns the option
unexercised and the time period is before the seller’s departure then it would
be ideal to be able to initiate another auction for an option on the seller’s
good. However, the system prevents a seller from re-auctioning an option
until the maximal patience, ∆max, after the option was ﬁrst allocated. Recall
that ∆max deﬁnes the maximal patience (departure-arrival) over all possible
buyers in the market. 16 This maintains a truthful mechanism by preventing
a buyer from acquiring an option with a view to holding it, returning it
unexercised, and later re-entering the market when the option is again
auctioned and achieving a lower price. 17
16 In practice one might choose to make a tradeoﬀ here, allowing earlier reposting
of an item in return for losing strategyproofness for all but the most patient buyers.
17 Here is an example where Alice has a useful manipulation of this kind: Alice
values an Apple for $5 from Mon to Wed. Bob values the Apple for $8 but only on
Mon. Consider a seller with an Apple and high patience. If Alice is truthful then
Bob wins on monday for $5 and exercises the option. But if Alice claims to value
an Apple together with a Banana at $10 only from Monday to Tuesday then Alice
wins the Apple option for $8, but returns it at the end of Tuesday. On Wednesday,
18Buyer Reported Type Monday Tuesday
Molly (Monday, Tuesday, $8) 6Nancy 6Nancy → 4Polly
Nancy (Monday, Tuesday, $6) - 4Polly
Polly (Monday, Tuesday, $4) - -
Table 1
A 3 buyer example in which each buyer wants a single item and one auction occurs
on each of Monday and Tuesday. “XY ” indicates an option with exercise price X and
book-keeping that a proxy has prevented Y from currently possessing an option.
“→” indicates the updating of exercise price, together with book-keeping for an
option already held.
In the absence of strong identities, the market prevents buyers from aﬀecting
future supply in a useful way by waiting a suﬃciently long amount of time
before reauctioning a returned options. 18 However, in the presence of strong
identities, the market can explicitly prevent a proxy’s buyer who has
returned an option from bidding on that option for ∆max into the future.
Consequently, a seller can reauction an option as soon as it is returned,
increasing the likelihood of selling the item before her departure.
3.2 Examples of Proxy Behavior
We ﬁrst provide an example to illustrate the price-matching logic that is
followed by proxies:
Example 3 Consider three buyers, all of whom enter the market on
Monday and depart the market after Tuesday. Molly values an item for $8,
Nancy for $6 and Polly for $4. On Monday, an auction occurs where all
three proxies bid, with Molly’s proxy winning the highest bid of $8 and
receiving an option for $6. Molly’s proxy adds Nancy to its local memory. On
Tuesday, another auction occurs where only Nancy’s and Polly’s proxy bid,
with Nancy’s proxy winning an option for $4 and noting that it bumped
Polly’s proxy. At this time, Molly’s proxy will price match its option down to
$4 (because Nancy is already in memory) and replace Nancy with Polly in its
local memory for book-keeping purposes, as Polly would be holding an option
had Molly delayed her bid past this round.
the seller re-posts and an Apple auction occurs with Alice returning and bidding $5
for an Apple alone and winning the Apple for $0.
18 One common technique that is used at present to achieve strong, or almost strong,
identities in electronic markets is to require a unique cell phone number of every
registration.
19To illustrate how the options-based scheme handles the exposure problem,
consider the following example where Alice desires a bundle of two goods:
Example 4 Alice values one ton of sand and one ton of stone together for
$3,000 (but has no value for either by itself). Bob values one ton of sand for
$800. Charlie values one ton of stone for $2,000. All buyers have a patience
of 2 days. On day one, a stone auction is held, where Alice’s proxy bids
$3,000 and Charlie’s bids $2,000. Alice’s proxy wins an option to purchase
stone for $2,000. On day two, a sand auction is held, where Alice’s proxy
bids $3,000 and Bob’s bids $800. Alice’s proxy wins an option to purchase
sand for $800. At the end of the second day, Alice’s proxy holds an option to
buy stone for $2,000 and sand for $800 and exercises both options spending
a total of $2,800.
As an illustration of how the options-based scheme handles substitutes
values consider the following example:
Example 5 Alice values either one ton of coarse sand for $1,000, or one
ton of ﬁne sand for $800 (but only $1,000 for both). Bob values coarse sand
for $800. Charlie values ﬁne sand for $900. On day one, a coarse sand
auction is held where Alice’s proxy bids $1,000 and Bob’s proxy bids $800,
resulting in Alice’s proxy winning an option for the coarse sand with an
exercise price of $800. On day two, a ﬁne sand auction is held where Alice’s
proxy bids $800 and Charlie’s proxy bids $900, resulting in Charlie’s proxy
winning an option for the ﬁne sand with an exercise price of $800. At the
end of day two, Alice’s proxy exercises its coarse sand option and Charlie’s
proxy exercises its ﬁne sand option.
3.3 Complexity Analysis
In providing a complexity analysis for the problem facing proxy agents, we
consider the particular case of a valuation function that is described in the
exclusive-or (XOR) bidding language [39]. An XOR-valuation of size M
deﬁnes a set of M atomic terms, {(L1,vi(L1)),...,(LM,vi(LM))}, and deﬁnes
valuation vi(S) = max
Lm⊆S,m∈{1,...,M}
[vi(Lm)] for any bundle S, where Lm is one
of the atomic terms. This is equivalent to saying that buyer i is interested in
buying at most one of the atomic bundles.
We have the following two easy results:
Theorem 1 Given an XOR-valuation of size M, there is an O(KiM2)
algorithm for computing the maximum marginal value on each interesting
good for buyer i ∈ B, where Ki = |
S
m∈{1,...,M}Lm| is the number of diﬀerent
20items in which the buyer is interested.
Proof. For each item, recall Equation 3.1, which deﬁnes the maximum
marginal value of an item. For each bundle Lm in the M-term valuation, and
any item Gk, vi(Lm ∪ {Gk}) can be identiﬁed by considering each of the M
terms in sequence. Therefore, the number of terms explored to determine the
maximum marginal value for any item Gk is O(M2), and the total number of
bundle comparisons to be performed to calculate the maximum marginal
value on every item is O(KiM2).
Theorem 2 The total memory required by a proxy to implement price
matching is O(Ki), where Ki = |
S
m∈{1,...,M} Lm| is the number of diﬀerent
items in which the buyer is interested. The total work performed by a proxy
in updating the state in each auction is O(1).
Proof. The proxy stores one maximum marginal value for each item of
interest, of which there are O(Ki); at most one buyer’s identity for each
item, of which there are O(Ki); and one exercise price for each such item, of
which there are O(Ki). For each auction, the proxy either submits a
precomputed bid or price matches, both of which take constant work.
4 Theoretical Analysis of the Options-Based Scheme
In this section, we establish that the options-based scheme supports truthful
bidding as a dominant bidding strategy for buyers and whatever the strategy
of sellers. We also develop a worst-case, competitive analysis for allocative
eﬃciency in the special case in which all buyers and sellers trade units of the
same good. This competitive analysis generalizes earlier analysis due to
Hajiaghayi et al. [25] to include a bound on the maximum ratio of minimum
to maximum values in the buyer population. This is a useful modiﬁcation
because values will typically fall into natural bounds in practical settings.
4.1 Strategic Analysis: Establishing Truthfulness
The proxies transform the market into a direct revelation mechanism, where
each buyer i makes a claim about her type to her proxy agent in some period
ˆ ai ≥ ai. We will show that it is a dominant strategy for a buyer to reveal her
true valuation and true departure time to her proxy agent immediately upon
arrival to the system, that is to bid her true type θi = (ai,di,vi). We assume
for technical reasons that the market is “opaque” so that no buyer receives
any information about prices or bids in the marketplace before submitting a
21bid to her proxy agent. 19 Note that this opaqueness is not required between
proxy agents and the market. On the contrary, it is vital that proxy agents
receive information about bids from other proxies in order to perform price
matching.
In establishing strategyproofness, we provide a slight generalization of an
existing characterization of strategyproof online auctions [25], to allow for
combinatorial online auctions. For this, deﬁne a value-independent price
function, psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L) ≥ 0, on all L ⊆ G, which can depend on the bids of
other agents b−i and the reported arrival ˆ ai and departure ˆ di of buyer i but
is value-independent in that it does not depend on the reported valuation ˆ vi
of the buyer. The price function also depends on the realization of supply,
but this dependence is suppressed to keep the notation simple.
Deﬁnition 2 (monotonic prices) A value-independent price function is
monotonic in arrival and departure if psa′
i,d′
i,b−i(L) ≥ psai,di,b−i(L), for all
buyers i, all a′
i ≥ ai, all d′
i ≤ di, all bids b−i by other buyers, all realizations
of supply, all ai,di and all L ⊆ G.
Monotonic prices increase with a tighter arrival-departure interval, or a
larger set of goods, and whatever the bids from other buyers and whatever
the realization of supply.
Lemma 1 An online combinatorial auction is strategyproof in a setting with
limited misreports, so that buyers can only report later arrivals ˆ ai ≥ ai, if
there exists a monotonic, value-independent price function, psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L),
such that for every buyer i, all reports ˆ θi = (ˆ ai, ˆ di,ˆ vi), all bids b−i from other
buyers, and all realizations of supply, the buyer is allocated a bundle
L∗
i ∈ argmaxL⊆G
h
vi(L) − psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L)
i
in period ˆ di and makes payment
psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L∗
i).
Proof. Fix some a′
i and d′
i. A buyer should report true valuation function,
ˆ vi = vi, because the prices she faces are independent of her report and by
being truthful bundle L∗
i maximizes her true utility. This in place, ﬁx ˆ vi = vi.
Now, it is never useful to bid ˆ di > di because the buyer will not receive her
allocation until her true departure (and have zero value.) By limited
misreports, the buyer cannot report ˆ ai < ai. Reporting ˆ ai > ai or ˆ di < di
(weakly) increases the price on every bundle L by monotonicity.
19 The impact of allowing buyers to see information about prices and bids would be
to change the equilibrium from a dominant strategy equilibrium to an ex post Nash
equilibrium, in which truthful bidding would remain an equilibrium for all possible
private types of other buyers and all possible futures as long as other buyers are
also rational and bid truthfully. The analysis is not changed in any substantive way.
22We construct a monotonic, valuation-independent price function for each
buyer in terms of the ﬁnal exercise prices of options held by the buyer’s
proxy agent and establish that the proxy agent maximizes the buyer’s
reported valuation function given these prices. The following lemma is useful
in establishing the correctness of the book-keeping algorithm:
Lemma 2 At any given time, for any buyer i, there is at most one other
buyer in the system whose proxy does not hold an option for a given item
because of buyer i’s presence, and the identity of that buyer will be stored in
buyer i’s proxy’s local memory at that time if such a buyer exists.
Proof. Fix some item and the proxy for buyer i. The proof is by induction
on the sequence of auctions for the item while buyer i’s proxy is present in
the market. The correctness of the information in the proxy’s local memory
is easy to establish in the base case before the proxy has participated in any
auction. Now consider the ﬁrst auction for this item in which the proxy wins
and suppose it prevents another proxy from winning an option on the good.
(This is the interesting case.) Consider now two cases: (a) the bumped proxy
will leave the system having never won an option on the item, or (b) the
bumped proxy will win an auction on this item in the future. In case (a),
while this bumped proxy is still present then proxy i’s presence prevented
exactly that one proxy but no other proxies from winning an option. This is
because the presence of the bumped proxy in the market does not preclude
any other proxy from winning (because the bumped proxy is losing anyway.)
The identity of this bumped proxy remains in proxy i’s local memory
because no price matching will have occurred on this item because each
winning proxy in each subsequent auction must have submitted a bid higher
than the bumped proxy’s bid (else the bumped proxy would have won) and
therefore higher than proxy i’s exercise price, which is initialized to the bid
price of the bumped proxy. Eventually the bumped proxy leaves and proxy i
no longer has any eﬀect on the bid dynamics for this item. At some point
some other proxy may win on this item and the proxy’s local memory is
cleared. In case (b), while the bumped proxy is not yet winning then this is
as in case (a). In period t in which the bumped proxy wins then proxy j,
with the highest other bid in that auction (if any), would have won without
i’s presence. Proxy i necessarily price matches in this case – because the
exercise price it could have achieved is the bid price of proxy j and less than
that of the winning (bumped) proxy and thus its current exercise price – and
then updates its local memory to contain the identity of proxy j. Proxy j is
the new proxy that does not hold an option because of buyer i’s presence in
the market. Case (a) or (b) now holds again for this new bumped proxy,
proxy j, and the proof continues until proxy i ﬁnally departs the market.
In proving the strategyproofness of the auction, we will consider the special
case of a function psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L) that is linear in the items Gk ∈ L, so that
23psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L) =
P
Gk∈L
psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k), where price function psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k) on items
is itself monotonic in arrival and departure. The following easy lemma is
stated without proof:
Lemma 3 The bundle of goods that maximizes a buyer’s reported valuation
given a linear, agent-independent and monotonic price function, deﬁned in
terms of the sum of prices on individual goods, will never contain an item
that is priced above her maximum marginal value.
Theorem 3 Truthful bidding is a dominant-strategy equilibrium for buyers
in the options-based, proxied market in a setting with limited misreports, so
that buyers can only report later arrivals ˆ ai ≥ ai.
Proof. Fix buyer i. First, deﬁne an agent-independent price, pt
b−i(k), on
item Gk in period t as the highest bid by the proxies  = i not holding an
option on item Gk at time t (∞ if there is no supply at t), and not including
any proxy that would have already won an option had i never entered the
system (i.e., whose identity is stored in the i’s proxy’s local memory for item
Gk by Lemma 2). Conditioned on t ≥ ˆ ai, this price is well deﬁned and
independent of any report ˆ θi buyer i makes to her proxy because the set
explicitly excludes the at most one proxy (see Lemma 2) that i prevents
from holding an option by its presence and is exactly those bids that would
be made without i present. (For this, we leverage that the bid values are
equal to maximal marginal values and independent of earlier bids by buyer
i’s proxy.) Furthermore, i cannot inﬂuence the supply of item Gk because
any options returned by other buyers due to a price set by i’s proxy’s bid
will be re-auctioned (if at all) after i has departed the system. Now deﬁne
psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k) = minˆ ai≤τ≤ˆ di pτ
b−i(k) (possibly ∞), which is well deﬁned upon ˆ di
and is monotonic in arrival and departure because it is deﬁned as the
minimal value over its domain. Conditioned on holding an option on Gk
upon departure, this is exactly the exercise price obtained by buyer i’s proxy.
Now deﬁne psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L) =
P
k:Gk∈L psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k), which is monotonic in ˆ ai and
ˆ di because psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k) is monotonic and remains value-independent. (Note
that this price is ∞ when there was never any supply of item Gk.) Given the
options held by a proxy at ˆ di, which may be a subset of those items Gk with
prices psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k) < ∞, the proxy exercises options to maximize utility
based on reported valuation, ˆ vi. We show that the proxy would not want to
select any options on items that are not available because the prices on
missing options would be too high. For this, consider such a bundle L′, that
is interesting based on ˆ vi but has one or more missing options. One
possibility is that there is an item Gk ∈ L′ for which an option was never for
sale, in which case psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k) = ∞ and psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L′) = ∞ and L′ is not
utility maximizing. On the other hand, in the case that every item in L′ was
available for sale in interval [ai,...,di], we know that pt
b−i(k) was at least the
24maximal marginal value in every such period (else the buyer’s proxy would
have won) and the bundle cannot maximize utility by Lemma 3.
A proxy acquires an option on every item that could possibly be in a buyer’s
utility-maximizing bundle at the ﬁnal prices. For any option that a proxy
agent does not explicitly hold upon departure, either the item was never for
sale, or the competition was such that the price was always so high that the
buyer would not want to exercise the option even if the clearing price on the
other options was zero.
Remark 1. The options-based scheme also satisﬁes voluntary participation
(or “individual rationality”) for both buyers and sellers, meaning that every
participant has non-negative utility in equilibrium. For buyers, this follows
because the proxy exercises a utility maximizing set of options and will
exercise no options if all bundles have negative utility. For sellers without
any intrinsic value for the good, voluntary participation follows because the
prices on options remain non-negative.
Remark 2. The options-based scheme is robust against buyers that can
participate under multiple identities or through re-entry with the same
identity. This is because the price function psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(L) is linear on every
bundle of goods L ⊆ G, being deﬁned as the sum of the prices, psˆ ai,ˆ di,b−i(k)
introduced in the proof. So long as the prices that a buyer faces remain
unchanged when she participates multiple times, she cannot gain by winning
multiple bundles because of linearity of prices and because all alternate bids
must necessarily have (weakly) tighter arrival-departure intervals and
therefore higher prices. In fact, the prices may increase – but cannot
decrease – when a buyer participates multiple times because prices in the
underlying auctions are weakly increasing in more participants (a property of
the Vickrey auction), and note that the supply available to a buyer is
unaﬀected by its strategy because of the delay that is required of a seller
before reposting an item for auction.
4.2 Eﬃciency Analysis
We provide a worst-case, competitive analysis in the special case in which all
participants are buying and selling one unit of the same kind of good. An
online mechanism is said to be k-competitive with respect to eﬃciency if it is
guaranteed to achieve an allocation with value at least 1/k of that achieved
in an optimal omniscient allocation. The omniscient allocation maximizes
total value given perfect hindsight about the arrival and departure and
values of market participants. For example, a mechanism that is
2-competitive for eﬃciency will achieve a total value that is at least half of
25the total value of the optimal, oﬄine allocation, for all possible inputs.
In this special case in which all buyers and sellers trading one unit of the
same good, our problem is the same as that considered by Hajiaghayi et
al. [25]. 20 These authors establish that their mechanism (and thus also our
options-based scheme) is 2-competitive for eﬃciency and prove a tight
lower-bound to show that no truthful, online mechanism can provide better
than 2-competitiveness. In this sense, we are comforted to see that our
scheme has the best possible, worst-case eﬃciency in this setting.
We provide a slight generalization of this analysis in which we parameterize
the competitive analysis with a lower bound, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, on the ratio of the
minimum to maximum value for the item in the buyer population; i.e.
wi/wj ≥ α for all buyers i,j ∈ B, with values wi,wj on the item for buyers i
and j respectively. For α = 0 there is no bound, for α = 1 then all buyers
have the same value. This additional constraint is relevant in modeling an
eBay like domain in which the inputs are not adversarial but instead drawn
from some distribution.
Theorem 4 When every buyer and seller is interested in trading one unit of
the same item, there is a lower-bound 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 on the ratio of minimum to
maximum values in the buyer population, and when all items are sold in the
options-based scheme (at least for α > 0), then the options-based scheme is
2
1+α-competitive for eﬃciency.
Proof. Let OFF and ON denote the winners in the oﬄine and online
solutions respectively. We seek a lower bound
VON/VOFF =
P
i∈ON vi/
P
i∈OFF vi ≥ 1/k for all possible inputs. For any input,
we can upper bound VOFF in terms of VON through a charging argument.
Following Hajiaghayi et al. [25], consider some buyer i ∈ OFF. We “charge”
her value to a buyer in ON. If i ∈ ON then we charge the value to herself.
Otherwise, let auc be the auction that i wins oﬄine. Since i never wins in
the options-based market, she was present in the market when auc closed,
and so the options-based scheme must have picked a winner j ∈ ON whose
value is (weakly) greater than the value of i. We charge the value of i to j. It
is not hard to see that this charging scheme charges each agent j in the
options-based market at most twice, each time for a value less than the value
of j. Let ONCE ⊆ ON and TWICE ⊆ ON denote the online winners that
are charged once and twice respectively. We have that VOFF ≤
P
j∈ONCE vj+
20 These authors propose a mechanism that combines a greedy matching algorithm,
in which the next item is allocated to the agent with the highest value that is
currently unmatched, and collects as payment from a winner the “critical value,”
which is the smallest value that the buyer could have reported and still been suc-
cessfully matched. It is easy to show that the options-based scheme presented here
is equivalent to this greedy, critical-value based mechanism in this special case.
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P
j∈TWICE vj. For α = 0 this gives
VON
VOFF ≥
(
P
j∈ONCE vj+
P
j∈TWICE vj)
(
P
j∈ONCE vj+2
P
j∈TWICE vj) ≥ 1/2,
with the worst-case occurring for ONCE = ∅. Consider now α > 0, and let
B′ ⊆ OFF denote the subset of OFF that are matched to the TWICE set.
Let K = |B′| and note that K must be even so that K/2 is an integer. Now,
for α > 0 we know that n = |OFF| = |ON|, because all items are sold in the
online solution by assumption. Then, we have |ONCE| = n − K,
|TWICE| = K/2, and an additional n − (n − K) − K/2 = K/2 winners in
ON. Let V denote the maximal value across all winners in set OFF. We
have VON ≥
P
j∈ONCE vj +
P
j∈TWICE vj + (K/2)αV , and therefore
VON
VOFF
≥
P
j∈ONCE vj +
P
j∈TWICE vj + (K/2)αV
P
j∈ONCE vj + 2
P
j∈TWICE
(4.1)
≥
(n − K)αV + (K/2)V + (K/2)αV
(n − K)αV + KV
(4.2)
=
α(n − K) + (K/2)(1 + α)
α(n − K) + K
(4.3)
≥
K/2(1 + α)
K
=
1 + α
2
, (4.4)
where the second inequality follows by substituting the smallest possible
values of agents in ONCE (counted equally in numerator and the
denominator) and the largest possible values of agents in TWICE (counted
twice in the denominator). The ﬁnal inequality follows by analysis of the rate
of change of the numerator and the denominator with respect to K for any
α ∈ (0,1], which is always more positive for the denominator than the
numerator and therefore a valid lower bound is achieved by setting K = n.
When α = 0, that is with no prior assumption about the possible range of
buyer values, we have exactly the competitive ratio of 2. The
competitiveness goes to 1 as α → 1, as the values become more and more
homogeneous. In our analysis of the eBay LCD market, we ﬁnd the values of
all buyers are bounded between $200 and $300, in which case α = 0.67 and
the competitive ratio for eﬃciency is around 1.2, which implies that the total
value of the allocation made by the options-based scheme is guaranteed to be
within 17% of the value of the best-possible oﬄine solution.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present the results of an experimental study of the
average-case performance of the options-based scheme for both eﬃciency and
revenue. This study is in two parts. We ﬁrst report results from an analysis
of data collected from eBay on all auctions for a 19” Dell LCD monitor sold
27during the summer of 2005. From this data we derive a population of buyers
and sellers, including estimates of the (true) arrival and departure times, and
true values of buyers. We adapt a non-parametric approach to estimate the
values of buyers (Haile and Tamer [24], extended to dynamic auctions in
Juda [31]), and couple this with bootstrapping to provide robustness. We
estimate that the options-based scheme would provide a 4% improvement in
eﬃciency and a 9% improvement in revenue over the status quo.
We also report the results from additional simulations designed to
understand the performance of the options-based scheme in environments in
which buyers have substitutes valuations or complements valuations. These
simulations are inspired by the eBay data but are not directly performed in
terms of this data because we do not attempt to identify the preferences of
buyers with more complex valuations. 21 Buyer populations with substitutes
valuations can hamper eﬃciency, although eﬃciency remains high when the
valuations of a given buyer for the diﬀerent items are either negatively
correlated or uncorrelated. Buyer populations with complements valuations
tend to achieve consistent eﬃciencies for diﬀerent within-buyer correlation
on the value of items. Finally, we study the role of liquidity by varying the
buyer-to-seller ratio and ﬁnd that for buyer-to-seller ratios that are typical in
the eBay marketplace the eﬃciency remains high even when buyers have
substitutes valuations over many diﬀerent items.
5.1 An eBay Market for LCD Screens
We collected data from eBay on all auctions for a 19” Dell LCD monitor
(Model E193FP) sold from 27 May, 2005 through 1 October, 2005, of which
there were 1,956 instances. 22 Assuming that each pseudonym represents a
21 When buyers have substitute preferences, it would be diﬃcult to determine the
entire set of substitutes in which a buyer may be interested, as a buyer on eBay may
have never bid on all substitutes. When buyers have complementary preferences, it
would be diﬃcult to determine based solely on their bidding behavior the extent
to which they already possess the complementary goods. For example, if we were
to observe a buyer bidding on a left shoe, there is no way to know deﬁnitively if
the buyer already possesses a right shoe, or only intends to start bidding on a right
shoe once a left shoe has been acquired.
22 Speciﬁcally, search queries found all auctions where the auction title contained all
of the following terms: ‘Dell,’ ‘LCD’ and ‘E193FP,’ while excluding all auctions that
contained any of the following terms: ‘Dimension,’ ‘GHZ,’ ‘desktop,’ ‘p4’ and ‘GB.’
The exclusion terms exist so that the only auctions analyzed would be those selling
exclusively the LCD of interest. For example, the few bundled auctions selling both
a Dell Dimension desktop and the E193FP LCD are excluded. Further information
on the ﬁelds for each auction and how those ﬁelds were processed is provided in
28unique buyer, we observe 10,151 distinct bidders participating in these
auctions. Given the data, our aim is to simulate a sequence of auctions for
options that match the timing of auctions on eBay and with the true,
underlying value of the buyers as identiﬁed from the eBay data. For eBay
revenue we take the revenue as deﬁned by the actual closing prices in the
data. For eBay eﬃciency we compute the eﬃciency implied by the allocation
on eBay and the estimate of the true values that we make for each winner.
For each auction that closes on eBay with a sale, we simulate a Vickrey
auction for an option on the item. Auctions on eBay in which the item goes
unsold are not considered within our simulation. 23 The sequence in our
simulation is the same as the sequence on eBay with an auction scheduled to
occur when it ﬁrst opens on eBay. An auction that opened at 1:00:00pm on
day 1 would be simulated before an auction that opened at 1:00:01pm on
day 1. We schedule auctions at the time an auction opens rather than closes
on eBay to allow for the possibility of re-posting an item that goes unsold.
(Although this is only relevant with more general valuations because all
options are exercised in the current context.)
We estimate the arrival, departure and value of each buyer on eBay from
their observed behavior. 24 Arrival is estimated as the ﬁrst time that a buyer
interacts with the eBay proxy, while departure is estimated as the latest
closing time among eBay auctions in which a buyer participates. Both are
clearly conservative, but adopted in the interest of simplicity. We note that
less conservative estimates of these timing constraints would improve the
performance of the options-based auction in simulation because there would
be greater competition. We are careful about the end eﬀects of the ﬁrst few
days of data and the last few days of data. 25
Juda [31].
23 Unsuccessful auctions are likely either completely unseen by the buyer population
or reserve auctions where the reserve price was not met. In either scenario, we
consider these auctions too unique to include in the simulation. For example, if
unsuccessful auctions were modeled in the options-based scheme, then more items
would be sold in the options scheme than on eBay, making it signiﬁcantly more
diﬃcult to compare the total revenue generated between the two markets.
24 The relatively few buyers observed to have won multiple items on eBay in practice
are simulated as multiple buyers with identical arrival, departure and value. At most
one of these identical buyers will participate in any given auction.
25 When running the simulations, the ﬁnal ten days worth of observed auctions are
not simulated. Ten days also is past the 90-percentile of the distribution of buyer
patience. Buyers bidding toward the end of the window are likely to bid higher
in the future on eBay than their current bids (this is suggested by the regression
analysis in Juda [31]), which results in inaccurately low estimates for buyer value
among these buyers. Similarly, we must allow for a start eﬀect in which the initial
revenue in simulation will be artiﬁcially high because no buyers in the initial period
will be marked as already traded when in fact they would have if the simulation
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(a) The probability density function
for revenue across sellers of the Dell
E193FP LCD screens using worst-case
estimates of buyer values. While the
average closing price on eBay, and in
the options scheme, are comparable,
the variance is signiﬁcantly lower in
the options scheme.
Options eBay
Price $239.66 $240.24
stddev(Price) $12 $32
V alue $263 $244
BuyerSurplus $23 $4
(b) The average price paid per good, av-
erage buyer value among winners, and
average winning buyer surplus on eBay
for Dell E193FP LCD screens as well as
the simulated options-based market us-
ing worst-case estimates of buyer values.
Fig. 1. Comparisons between empirically observed results on eBay and simulation
results of the options scheme using a worst-case estimate of buyers’ true valuations.
In our ﬁrst experiments, we adopt a conservative estimate of the true value
of a buyer on eBay, estimating this simply as the highest bid this buyer was
observed to have placed in any LCD auction. Figure 1(a) shows the
distribution of closing prices both on eBay and in the simulated options
scheme under this “worst-case” assumption. The closing price in the
simulation is deﬁned as the ﬁnal exercise price (i.e., after price matching.)
The revenue is similar between the two schemes while the estimated eﬀect on
eﬃciency suggests an advantage for the options-based scheme. See Figure
1(b). While the winning buyers on eBay have an estimated mean value of
$244, the options scheme’s winning buyers have a mean value of $263 (a 7%
increase). Consumer surplus, which measures the average buyer utility over
all winning buyers, increases in the options-based scheme from $4 to $23 (an
improvement of roughly 500%). Notice also that the standard deviation of
prices is signiﬁcantly reduced in the options-based scheme.
Figure 2 shows a very distinct diﬀerence between eBay and the options
scheme. We plot the closing price of an auction against the patience of the
auction’s winner. In the options scheme, not only do buyers with a larger
patience generally pay lower prices than buyers with smaller patience but
the variance of price paid decreases with patience.
had started earlier. For this, the options simulation starts from the initial period
but revenue is only accounted after the ﬁrst ten days.
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Fig. 2. A scatter plot of the price paid by winners against the patience of the buyer
(in secs) for Dell E193FP LCD screens using worst-case estimates of buyer values.
In our second set of experiments we adopt a less conservative estimate of the
true value of a buyer by using the non-parametric methods of Haile and
Tamer [24], generalized to apply to dynamic auctions. 26 Figure 3(a) shows
the distribution of actual closing prices in eBay and in the options scheme as
simulated with this new, less conservative estimate. The mean price in the
options scheme is now signiﬁcantly higher than the mean price on eBay ($240
on eBay, $276 in the options scheme). The standard deviation on closing
prices in the options scheme is also signiﬁcantly less, being $32 on eBay vs.
$14 in the options scheme. The estimated eﬃciency of the options-based
scheme remains higher than that on eBay. While the winning buyers on eBay
are estimated to have a mean (true) value of $281, the winners in the options
scheme are estimated to have a mean value that is 7.5% higher (at $302). 27
It bears emphasis that in reporting these results, the same value estimates
that are adopted in the simulation of the options scheme are also adopted in
estimating the total value of the allocation implemented on eBay.
Bootstrapping While the simulation of the options-based market suggests
better eﬃciency and revenue results performance than on eBay, a reasonable
concern may be that the performance of the options-based market is
inﬂuenced by speciﬁc details of the particular buyer population considered.
To alleviate these concerns, we also perform a set of bootstrapped
simulations. Rather than using the 10,151 unique buyers observed to have
26 See Juda [31] for more information. In particular, we are able to estimate that
the true values of buyers on eBay are 15% greater than their observed maximum
bids. This estimate is based on identifying a multiplicative factor that separates the
distribution of observed bid values from a conservative estimate on the distribution
of underlying values that can be derived through analysis of order statistics and
simple, reasonable assumptions.
27 The consumer surplus for buyers in the options scheme is estimated to be slightly
below that on eBay, but this could be easily addressed by the use of fees or other
methods to redistribute surplus.
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(a) Revenue distribution among auc-
tions on eBay and in the simulated
options-scheme for a less conservative
estimate of buyer values.
Options eBay
Price $275.80 $240.24
stddev(Price) $14 $32
V alue $302 $281
BuyerSurplus $26 $40
(b) The average price paid per good, av-
erage buyer value among winners, and av-
erage winning buyer surplus on eBay and
under the simulated options market, for
Dell E193FP LCD screens and a less con-
servative estimate of buyer values.
Fig. 3. Comparisons between empirically observed results on eBay and simulation
results of the options scheme using a less conservative estimate of buyers’ true
valuations.
Options
Bootstrap
Options Bootstrap
Bootstrap
eBay eBay
Price $275.80 0.95 $261.89 1.09 $240.24
($1.37)
V alue $302 0.97 $292 1.04 $281
($0.86)
BuyerSurplus $26 1.14 $30 0.74 $40
($0.95)
Table 2
Average results of 50 bootstrapped simulations of the options-based scheme (stan-
dard deviations in parentheses), compared to the options-based scheme without
bootstrapping and eBay.
participated on eBay in the simulation we instead simulate the options-based
market using 10,151 buyers where each buyer is drawn uniformly with
replacement among all buyers observed to have bid on eBay. This creates a
buyer population that is similar to that observed on eBay, while providing
insight into how sensitive the results are to the exact combination of buyers
observed. Table 2 provides the average result of 50 bootstrapped simulations,
together with the performance of the options-based scheme without
bootstrapping and the results for the actual allocation in the eBay market.
The results support an estimate of eﬃciency that is 4% greater than on eBay
and revenue that is 9% greater than on eBay.
325.2 Simulation: Substitutes Preferences
While the options-based market appears eﬀective when the bidding
population has simple preferences and wants only a single good, we now
examine the eﬃcacy of the system when buyers have substitutes preferences.
To see why substitutes preferences can be problematic consider the following:
Example 6 Alice values one of either an apple or banana by Tuesday for
$10. Bob values one of either an apple or banana by Tuesday for $8. On
Sunday, an apple auction is held where Alice’s proxy wins an option for the
apple for $8. On Monday, a banana auction is held where Alice’s proxy wins
an option for the banana for $8. At the end of Tuesday, Alice’s proxy
exercises one of her two options, returning the other option, while Bob leaves
the market having acquired nothing.
Clearly, it would have been more eﬃcient for Bob to have won an option for
only one of the pieces of the fruit. However, the scheme has Alice’s proxy
holding both options. We refer to this as the holdup problem. 28
We ﬁrst consider a market in which buyers have substitutes preferences over
two items. Inspired by the observed population of eBay, we consider a
market with a 120-day time period where each buyer’s value is distributed
normally over a Gaussian distribution for Monitor A with mean $265 and
standard deviation $45 and for Monitor B with mean $240 and standard
deviation $20. The value for the bundle of A and B is the maximum of the
two values. 5,000 buyers arrive uniformly over the 120-day time period, and
with patience distributed according to a Normal distribution with a mean of
3.9 days and a standard deviation 11.4 days (as was observed to be the mean
and standard deviation of patience among the eBay buyers), and truncated
to be non-negative and rounded to the nearest day. We model 2,000 sellers
that enter the market uniformly over the 120-day time period, with the
patience of each seller distributed by a Normal distribution with a mean of 7
days and a standard deviation 1 day. Each seller oﬀers one of Monitor A or
Monitor B with equal probability. In simulation, an auction is scheduled for
a seller for an option on her good immediately upon arrival and the good is
re-posted when a seller’s option is returned unexercised before her
departure. 29
28 To provide a counterpoint, note that if buyers have linear-additive values on
individual items then they will always exercise every option they win and no options
will be returned and go unsold. This is because the maximum marginal value of each
item is exactly the value a buyer will ultimately realize in exercising that option,
whatever the details of the other goods that it wins.
29 For this to be possible in practice without introducing new opportunities for buyer
manipulation we would need to prevent a buyer’s proxy from rebidding on the same
33Buyers’ Items Total Buyer Sellers Eﬃciency
Values Sold (%) Value Surplus (%) Returned (%) (%)
- Correlated 100.0 569,665 7.6 0.02 96.5
Uncorrelated 87.1 500,571 8.5 18.3 85.2
+ Correlated 61.4 362,704 9.2 41.7 63.3
Table 3
Market performance (averaged over 30 instances) with 5,000 buyers and 2,000 sellers
in a 120 day marketplace and buyers with substitutes preferences on 2 items.
In the experiments, we consider both a positive and a negative correlation
between the value that a buyer has for Monitor A and Monitor B. Positive
correlations might exist if some buyers possess generally higher valuations
across all items than other buyers. Negative correlations suggest that buyers
have strong “tastes” for each item and it likely that either one or the other
item will appeal to a particular buyer but not both. 30
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the performance of the market in this
setting. Rather than provide a comparison to eBay, we compare to the
eﬃciency that would be possible in an omniscient solution (found here as the
solution to a mixed-integer program). The “sellers returned” statistic
indicates the average number of sellers whom have an option returned
unsold. One can understand by comparing the fraction of items sold and the
fraction of “sellers returned” the number of items that are sold successfully
on second (and later) attempts; e.g., for uncorrelated values 18.3% of items
are initially unsold but only 100-87.1=12.9% of items are unsold eventually.
When values across the two items are negatively correlated the market in
eﬀect breaks itself up into two disjoint markets, one for the ﬁrst and one for
the second item, because buyers do not typically possess a suﬃciently high
value on both of the items to be competitive on both. Because of this all
items are typically sold and the eﬃciency is high and there is only a slight
holdup problem. On the other hand, when values across the two items are
either uncorrelated or positively correlated, buyers are more likely to hold
options on both items, thus causing holdup problems and blocking
lower-valued buyers who may never hold an option.
item within period ∆max, as discussed in Section 3.1.
30 To model positive correlation, if a buyer’s valuation for Monitor A is x standard
deviations above the mean, her valuation for Monitor B is set to x standard devia-
tion above the mean (c.f. for x standard deviations below the mean). Alternatively,
to model negative correlation, if a buyer’s valuation for Monitor A is x standard de-
viations above the mean, her valuation for Monitor B is set to x standard deviations
below the mean (c.f. for x standard deviations below the mean).
34Buyers’ Items Total Buyer Sellers Eﬃciency
Values Sold (%) Value Surplus (%) Returned (%) (%)
Uncorrelated 75.0 632,504 7.5 33.8 74.5
+ Correlated 44.4 388,191 8.6 58.1 47.2
Table 4
Market performance (averaged over 30 instances) with 5,000 buyers and 3,000 sellers
in a 120 day marketplace. Buyers possess substitutes preferences over 3 items.
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Fig. 4. Market performance (averaged over 30 runs) with 1,000 buyers and 1,000
sellers in a 120 day marketplace with 10 diﬀerent kinds of goods being oﬀered.
Buyers have substitutes preferences over a varying number of items.
Similar results are found when we consider substitute preferences over three
items (where the distribution of value for the third item Normal with mean
$265 and standard deviation $45), and scaling the number of sellers to
$3,000 from $2,000 to keep the same number of each item supplied on
average. See Table 4. When the values across the three items are positively
correlated for a buyer, less items are sold and the market eﬃciency falls. 31
As a third experiment with substitutes preferences, we investigate the extent
to which the number of items for which each buyer has some value can aﬀect
the performance of the market. For this, we consider a market with 1,000
buyers and 1,000 sellers and 10 diﬀerent kinds of items. Buyers possess
substitutes preferences on between 1 and 10 items, always with uncorrelated
31 There being no simple way to deﬁne negatively correlated values on three items
we just present results for uncorrelated and positively correlated values.
35values across items. 32 The value on a bundle of items is deﬁned as
vi(L) = max
Gk∈Lvi(k), (5.1)
i.e. these are pure substitutes valuations. Figure 4 illustrates the average
market performance of the options-based scheme. As the number of items in
which a buyer is interested increases (the “size” of a buyer’s valuation), the
additional competition reduces buyer surplus. In addition, eﬃciency falls
because the holdup problem gets worse. However, it is interesting that the
number of items sold remains fairly constant at around 53%. In Section 5.4
we will see that the eﬀect of the size of a buyer’s substitutes valuation on
eﬃciency depends on the buyer-to-seller ratio and is signiﬁcantly improved
for higher buy-side competition.
5.3 Simulation: Complements Preferences
We now consider buyers with complements valuations among items. While a
buyer has a value on each item by itself, in this simulation she is also
interested in acquiring both items. The synergy (or lack thereof) of acquiring
both items is provided via a Gaussian distributed multiplicative factor,
β ∈ (−1,1), of the sum of the values of the individual components of the
bundle, such that the value for two items, vi({A} ∪ {B}) = (1 + β)
(vi({A}) + vi({B})), and we deﬁne β ∼ N(0,0.1). We also consider
correlation (both negative and positive) across the single-item values on
diﬀerent items. We simulate a market with 5,000 buyers and 2,000 sellers
and 120 days, adopting the same set-up as in the substitutes experiments.
Table 5 shows summary statistics for the performance of the market. The
average bundle size is the average number of items allocated to buyers,
conditioned on winning buyers. This increases from uncorrelated to
correlated values across items. This time the correlation seems unimportant,
and no matter whether values across items are positively or negatively
correlated, we see that around 80% of the items are sold. The number of
items sold is relatively high because buyers who hold multiple options can
generally exercise both options because of their complements valuations. The
number of items sold is not limited as much because of holdup with
complements as with substitutes preferences. An individual buyer’s surplus
tends to be higher when values are positively correlated because, conditioned
on winning at all, she is likely to have higher value on both items and thus
32 The speciﬁc distributions from which valuations are drawn are as follows:
vi(1) ∼ N(260,45),vi(2) ∼ N(240,10),vi(3) ∼ N(250,5),vi(4) ∼ N(280,5),vi(5) ∼
N(260,20),vi(6) ∼ N(230,55),vi(7) ∼ N(220,60),vi(8) ∼ N(245,5),vi(9) ∼
N(260,5),vi(10) ∼ N(290,5).
36Buyers’ Items Number of Average Total Buyer Sellers
Values Sold (%) Buyers Bundle Size Value Surplus (%) Returned (%)
- Correlated 80.0 1,253 1.28 477,388 6.4 31.4
Uncorrelated 80.7 1,139 1.42 487,841 7.5 29.7
+ Correlated 77.3 926 1.67 477,257 9.0 35.1
Table 5
Market performance with 5,000 buyers and 2,000 sellers in a 120 day marketplace.
Buyers possess complements preferences over 2 items.
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Fig. 5. Eﬃciency of the options-based scheme at various buyer-to-seller ratios (av-
eraged over 30 runs). Buyers have substitutes preferences on diﬀerent numbers of
items. Number of sellers ﬁxed at 500. Number of days ﬁxed at 120.
higher surplus (while continuing to beneﬁt from price matching). In a
simulation in which the number of sellers is increased to 3,000 and buyers
have complements valuations on three items, but otherwise unchanged, the
number of items sold remains at around 80% of supply for both uncorrelated
and positively correlated across-item values.
5.4 Simulation: Market Liquidity
For our ﬁnal study we consider buyers with substitute preferences and
uncorrelated values across items and vary the liquidity in the market. For
this, we vary the buyer-to-seller ratio, which is the ratio of the total number
of buyers to sellers in the market, and ﬁx the number of sellers at 500.
Figure 5 plots the eﬃciency (calculated as the ratio of total value of goods
allocated in the options-based scheme to a greedy online allocation that
approximates the total possible realizable value) against buyer-to-seller
37ration. 33 We adopt this online benchmark because we are interested to
understand how our solution to the strategic problem (through options,
proxies and price-matching) aﬀects performance in relation to a non
strategyproof online algorithm. scheme.
What is particularly interesting is that eﬃciency initially tends to decrease
with increasing buyer-to-seller ratio (for all numbers of items other than one)
but then increases again. 34 For extremely low buyer-to-seller ratios there is
little competition in the market and buyers do not holdup each other too
badly and the eﬃciency is high even with substitutes valuations on many
items. As the buyer-to-seller ratio increases eﬃciency falls as more buyers are
blocked because of the holdup problem. At some point, though, eﬃciency
begins to increase again because it becomes less likely that any single buyer
will be competitive on multiple items. The eﬀect is to separate the market
across diﬀerent types of goods, with each buyer tending to only win on one
or two goods and therefore causing only a slight holdup problem and
providing higher eﬃciency. On eBay, for example, we see a buyer-to-seller
ratio well above 5:1 in the LCD market and might expect eﬃciency to
remain high even when buyers have large substitutes valuations.
6 Discussion: Improving Market Eﬃciency
The empirical study in the previous section not withstanding, two factors
that limit the market eﬃciency of the options-based scheme are:
(1) Proxy agents hold onto options that they will likely not exercise.
(2) Proxy agents bid their maximum marginal value for options.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, notice that while proxy agents exercise every
option that they hold when items have constant marginal value (e.g., when a
buyer wants a single item, or has a linear valuation function), a number of
33 The greedy online allocation looks at all buyers and sellers in the market in each
day (i.e., considering all auctions on that day) and computes an optimal provisional
allocation of goods among the population using a mixed-integer program. For each
pair of buyers and sellers that have been matched in the allocation if either one
departs at the end of the day then the trade between them is ﬁnalized. Otherwise,
both buyers and sellers carry over into the next day and continue to be available
for provisional allocation.
34 For the problem instance where buyers are only interested in a single item, eﬃ-
ciency is always very close to 100% for all buyer-to-seller ratios. Note also that while
there is a data point above 100% this is not a spurious result because the baseline
greedy online heuristic is not guaranteed to be optimal, and it is possible that the
options-based scheme can outperform the greedy online heuristic.
38options will be returned in general. This occurs quite frequently in our
experiments, although a number of these items are ultimately sold upon
reposting in a new auction. One simple improvement that can be adopted is
to allow a seller who wishes to leave the marketplace but has an issued
option to leave (with the good) if the proxy already knows that the option
will deﬁnitely go unexercised. In so doing, sellers need only remain in the
market while there is some possibility that their option will be exercised.
However, it is diﬃcult to provide sellers with additional ﬂexibility, for
example to allow a seller to oﬀer multiple options for the same unit of a
good, without compromising the strategyproofness of the market for buyers.
If faced with options that do not provide a deﬁnite right to exercise and
receive a good (for instance if two options are issued on the same unit and
both proxies seek to exercise them), then proxy agents would have an
incentive to bid for multiple options on the same good.
Regarding the second point, notice that proxy agents may be submitting
excessively large values when bidding maximum marginal values. Even if a
proxy is already guaranteed utility z on a bundle of options (based on their
current exercise price), the proxy will still go ahead and bid for options on
items that could not possibly bring utility of more than z at any exercise
price, including zero. The bid price is not adaptive to options, and exercise
prices, already secured. We would wish to provide a proxy with a less
aggressive bidding strategy and prevent a proxy from acquiring options on
items that are currently priced too high to be exercised and especially those
that will never be exercised. A natural candidate for a less aggressive bidding
strategy – which would still provably acquire all options that could possibly
be useful – is to bid the maximum willingness to pay given its current
allocation of options and the current exercise prices on these options. That
is, the proxy should factor in its current state in deciding how much to bid.
For example, suppose that Alice values exactly one piece of fruit (either an
apple at $10, a banana at $5, or an orange at $5). If Alice’s proxy already
holds an option for an apple with an exercise price of $8, she might only bid
$3 (instead of $5) in future auctions for bananas and oranges because
securing an option for a banana or an orange at a price above $3 would only
be dominated by the apple option. Similarly, if Alice’s proxy already holds
an option for an apple with an exercise price of $2, she should not bid at all
for bananas or oranges, as the maximum surplus possible from acquiring a
banana or an orange is guaranteed to be less than the surplus of $10-2=$8
already guaranteed for the apple.
Formalizing, let Ot denote the set of options held by a proxy at time t,
γ(L) ⊆ G denote the goods that correspond to some subset L ⊆ Ot of these
options, and pt(L) =
P
k∈L pt(k) denote the total exercise price in period t
for this set of options where pt(k) is the current exercise price on the option
39for good Gk. Let ˆ ut
i(L) = ˆ vi(γ(L)) − pt(L) denote the reported utility of the
buyer for options, L. Let Lt∗ denote the set of options that maximizes this
reported utility. Given this, deﬁne the maximal willingness to pay for an
option on an item k given the current state of the proxy as:
wtp
t
i(k) = max
S [0,min[ˆ vi(S ∪ {Gk}) − ˆ u
t
i(L
t∗), ˆ vi(S ∪ {Gk}) − ˆ vi(S)]], (6.1)
where ˆ vi(S ∪ {Gk}) − ˆ ut
i(Lt∗) considers the utility already guaranteed with
the current options, and ˆ vi(S ∪ {Gk}) − ˆ vi(S) is the maximal marginal value
of good Gk. This expression calculates the greatest amount a buyer will
possibly be willing to spend on an item given the current options held and
with uncertainty as to what future items will appear in auctions and about
future option prices (assume all S ∪ {Gk} are free while the prices on items
in Lt∗ remain the same). However, this scheme cannot be implemented in the
proxied architecture without forfeiting truthfulness:
Example 7 Both Alice and Bob have substitutes valuations. Alice values
either one ton of sand for $2,000, one ton of stone for $1,900 and both for
$2,000. Bob values either one ton of sand for $1,800, one ton of stone for
$1,500 and both for $1,800. Both buyers have a patience of 2 days. On day
one, a sand auction is held, where Alice’s proxy bids $2,000 and Bob’s bids
$1,800. Alice’s proxy wins an option to purchase sand for $1,800. On day
two, a stone auction is held, where Alice’s proxy bids $1,700 [as she has
already obtained a guaranteed $200 of surplus from winning a sand option,
and so reduces her stone bid by this amount], and Bob’s bids $1,500. Alice’s
proxy wins an option to purchase stone for $1,500. At the end of the second
day, Alice’s proxy would exercise the option she holds for stone with an
exercise price of $1,500 to obtain a good valued for $1,900, and so obtains
$400 in surplus. Now consider what would happen if Alice instead lies,
declares that she values only stone, and for $1,900. On day one, a sand
auction is held, where Bob’s proxy bids $1,800. Bob’s proxy wins an option to
purchase sand for $0 (because Alice’s proxy stays out). On day two, a stone
auction is held, where Alice’s proxy bids $1,900, and Bob’s bids $0 [as he has
already obtained at least $1,800 of surplus from winning the sand option, and
so is not interested in winning the stone option]. Alice’s proxy wins the stone
option with an exercise price of $0, achieving $1,900 in surplus.
By misrepresenting her valuation, Alice was able to secure higher surplus by
giving more surplus to Bob and therefore reducing the competition that she
faced in a future auction. The basic tenet of strategyproof mechanisms
requires that the prices faced by a bidder, such as Alice, should be
independent of her strategy. This has been compromised because there is
now some potential for Alice to inﬂuence Bob’s bids in the future and in
turn the price that she will face. The technical problem is that the value,
ˆ ut
i(Lt∗), in Equation 6.1 is the amount of surplus already guaranteed to
40buyer i, and this now depends on the proxy bids of some other buyer. A
slight modiﬁcation to the option-based scheme, presented in Juda [31], can
address this problem in a restricted (“set-valued”) class of valuation
domains, namely those in which there are two kinds of goods A and B, and
each buyer is either indiﬀerent between A and B or interested in the bundle
AB. However, we do not know of a remedy to this problem that will allow
proxy agents to bid adaptively in more general valuation domains and leave
this for future work.
We see a number of additional directions for future work. These include:
(a) Allowing buyers to return options to the market early. We ask whether a
scheme can be developed in which a buyer can return an option as soon as
her proxy determines that the option will never be exercised given the other
options it holds. Such a return would reduce the holdup problem and
improve eﬃciency.
(b) Allowing buyers to demand multiple units of a particular item. This
seems quite challenging because a naive solution will leave proxies facing a
tradeoﬀ between competing to acquire additional options on a particular
good or choosing not to compete, perhaps eliciting greater opportunities for
price matching on options that they already hold.
(c) Allowing sellers to have values on bundles rather than items. Scenarios
may exist where sellers are interested in selling multiple items in a single lot.
The amount of information required to perform book-keeping and track the
minimal price possible across auctions is greater than in the current system;
in particular, it seems that all bundles in which a bumped buyer is interested
would need to be stored.
(d) Allowing a buyer’s value to vary with time. For example, a buyer’s
valuation may decrease over time. The diﬃculty in retaining the
dominant-strategy equilibrium property of the market is that a naive
solution will leave a proxy with the need to decide if it should delay the
exercising of its option, risking the degradation of value but possibly gaining
a lower exercise price.
(e) Mitigating strategic problems facing sellers. While our results suggest
that sellers can increase their revenue over the eBay protocol when all sellers
participate and are straightforward – reporting true arrival and departure
information – such behavior may not always be in the best interest of each
seller. For example, a seller may do better by delaying her entry into the
market if she believes the market is currently “cold” but will soon become
“hot” such that there is more competition and higher prices.
41(f) Exploring hierarchical options-based schemes. The use of options in this
paper shifts the sequential auction problem across auctions in a site to a
similar problem across diﬀerent auction sites (e.g. eBay and Yahoo!). It is
interesting to consider whether a hierarchical options-based scheme can be
developed to help to mitigate the strategic complexity that buyers likely face
when bidding across sites.
7 Conclusions
We have proposed a novel, options-based method for resolving the strategic
diﬃculties faced by buyers in uncoordinated electronic marketplaces. Our
solution to the sequential auction problem is to require that buyers submit
bids to mandatory bidding proxies which then bid for options on goods and
exercise options to maximize reported buyer utility. By allowing proxy
agents to match the exercise prices of options to the lowest price that would
have been possible through careful timing of the proxy’s bid, it becomes a
dominant strategy for buyers to report their true value and true temporal
constraints to the market. The proxy agents act across multiple auctions and
bring simple, truthful bidding into an equilibrium while retaining the
dynamic arrivals and departures of open, Internet marketplaces and
operating without batching auctions. An empirical analysis that is informed
by data collected on eBay for the auctions of LCD monitors suggests that
the options-based scheme can provide an improvement in eﬃciency and
revenue over eBay of around 4% and 9% respectively. A series of experiments
to examine the eﬀect of a holdup problem that can exist when buyers have
general valuations shows that this is mitigated when competition is either
very low or high, or when individual buyers have negatively correlated values
across items. Eﬃciency also remains relatively high when buyers have
complements valuations, where eﬃciency is promoted when sellers can
re-post goods for sale whose options go unexercised.
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